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People consider fairness as well as their own interest whenmaking decisions in economic
games. The present study proposes a model that encompasses the self-concept
determined by one’s own kindness as a factor of fairness. To observe behavioral patterns
that reflect self-concept and fairness, a chicken game experiment was conducted.
Behavioral data demonstrates four distinct patterns; “switching,” “mutual rush,” “mutual
avoidance,” and “unfair” patterns. Model estimation of chicken game data shows that
a model with self-concept predicts those behaviors better than previous models of
fairness, suggesting that self-concept indeed affects human behavior in competitive
economic games. Moreover, a non-stationary parameter analysis revealed the process
of reaching consensus between the players in a game. When the models were fitted to
a continuous time window, the parameters of the players in a pair with “switching” and
“mutual avoidance” patterns became similar as the game proceeded, suggesting that
the players gradually formed a shared rule during the game. In contrast, the difference
of parameters between the players in the “unfair” and “mutual rush” patterns did not
become stable. The outcomes of the present study showed that people are likely to
change their strategy until they reach a mutually beneficial status.
Keywords: fairness, altruism, reciprocity, self-concept, computational model, economic game
Introduction
People have motivation to care about other people (Hume, 1740; Smith, 1759; MacIntyre, 1967),
unlike the assumption of traditional economic models that people are exclusively motivated to
pursue their own material interest (Kahneman et al., 1986). One critical factor affecting such other-
regarding interest is “fairness.” People are willing to sacrifice their own interest if it is considered
fair (Rabin, 1993). Some studies suggest “altruism” as a source of fairness (Eckel and Grossman,
1996), while other studies propose “reciprocity” (Cox et al., 2007). Altruism stands for the behavior
of people who perceive an equal distribution of welfare among people as fair. Human behavior
in laboratory experiments of public goods games evidences altruism as a factor in decision-making
(Andreoni, 1988, 1995). In those experiments, people did not necessarily contribute to public goods
at all to maximize their own interest, but most people chose to sacrifice their payoff to some degree
to increase the total public payoff (Dawes and Thaler, 1988). In addition to altruism, reciprocity has
long been studied as a factor of fairness. People often sacrifice their own welfare to help those who
are being kind (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Güth et al., 1982; Van de Kragt et al., 1983; Isaac et al.,
1984; Kim and Walker, 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Orbell et al., 1988) or to
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punish others those who are being harmful (Goranson and
Berkowitz, 1966; Greenberg, 1978; Güth et al., 1982; Kahneman
et al., 1986; Roth et al., 1991; Thaler, 1999). For example, in an
ultimatum game, people often reject to receive a smaller payoff
than their counterparts and rather choose an allocation in which
neither player receives any payoff (Slonim and Roth, 1998).
This long line of evidence supports that fairness is a critical
factor of decision-making (Cox and Deck, 2005; Cox et al., 2008).
To consolidate our understanding of fairness in human behavior,
various computational models have been developed (Rabin, 1993;
Levine, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Cox and Sadiraj, 2005; Cox
et al., 2007). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proposed amodel featuring
inequality averseness of individuals to explain the altruistic
behaviors that deviate from pure self-interest. According to their
model, people prefer a “fair” distribution of income so that
little differences between their own income and other people’s
income exist. The Fehr–Schmidt model and its variations are
consistent with many experimental results showing the other-
regarding interest of people (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
However, this simple preference model does not capture the
intentions of people behind their behaviors in different contexts.
For example, in a mini-ultimatum game, when the first mover
chooses between two alternatives, identical offers are evaluated
differently by the secondmover according to possible alternatives
(Falk et al., 2008). People are willing to accept an unequally
distributed payoff offer when the alternative is even more unfair.
That is, if a seemingly unfair action is conducted with good
intention, people perceive the action as less harmful.
Capturing the intention of other people is especially important
in the models based on reciprocity. A model developed by Rabin
(1993) considers the intentions of other people to find fairness
equilibria. In his model, the kindness of people is determined
by their intention. Even a harmful action of a person does
not induce negative reciprocity of another to punish him/her
if there is no better alternative. In Rabin’s fairness equilibria,
such reciprocal motivation is emphasized rather than the equal
distribution of income. Many recent studies support the effects of
reciprocity on people’s preference rather than simple inequality
averseness (e.g., Blount, 1995; Brandts and Charness, 2000).
However, higher-order beliefs about other people’s intentions
assumed in the model are too complex to define in behavioral
data, because they are not reported directly in most experiments
and also because there are many constraints in reporting the
feeling at the moment (Robinson and Clore, 2002). To avoid
the complications of the equilibrium model involving higher-
order beliefs, Cox et al. (2007) introduced a model of reciprocity
and fairness that simplifies contexts affecting people’s preference.
Their model introduces “emotional states” that reflect reciprocity
without the assumption of complex beliefs. A kind behavior
induces positive emotional state while a harmful behavior leads
to negative emotional state. People with a positive emotional state
are inclined to give others a positive payoff and those with a
negative emotional state prefer to give a negative payoff to others.
Cox et al.’s (2007) model is easily applicable to various economic
games because of its tractability, compared tomodels that assume
higher-order beliefs.
Most economic games have a bilateral flow of benefit in which
the players’ payoff is determined by their joint action, not by an
action of a single player. That is, the structure of reciprocity is
bilateral (Molm, 2010), and therefore both players can benefit
or harm each other. Thus, the self-concept of a player has to be
considered in addition to the reciprocity that reflects the kindness
of another player. People consider the morality or kindness of
their own behavior to define their self-concept (Dunning, 2007).
People’s self-worth is lowered after they harm another person and
they becomemore altruistic to compensate the immoral behavior
(Carlsmith and Gross, 1969). Similarly, people with increased
self-worth after a kind behavior are more likely to engage in
an immoral behavior (Monin and Miller, 2001; Khan and Dhar,
2007). These phenomena are attributed to the monitoring and
balancing of self-concept that maintains one’s self-worth to an
ideal level in which an individual feels the most comfortable. If
people feel that their self-worth is lower than their standard, they
try to increase their self-worth by a positive behavior. In the same
way, they lower their self-worth with a negative behavior when
their self-worth is higher than their standard (Sachdeva et al.,
2009).
Because the previous models regarding reciprocity do not
capture the self-concept of an individual, the present study
proposes a model to incorporate self-concept into the model of
fairness. In the previous models, reciprocity emerges only from
the concept about other people. However, our model determines
reciprocity by a comparison between the self-concept and the
concept about others. If an individual has relatively negative
self-worth compared to his/her concept about the other, he/she
has positive reciprocity and is inclined to help the counterpart.
That is, people in the present model choose to help their unkind
counterparts if they perceive themselves more unkind than the
counterparts. In addition, the present model assumes that the
sense of reciprocity is more volatile than the calculation of
relative payoffs so it better captures the dynamic changes of
reciprocity during a social interaction. People may easily forget
past negative reciprocity in the face of kindness of the former
counterpart, while the difference between material payoffs is
constant (Komorita et al., 1991).
In the present study, we compared the proposed model with
the previous models regarding the fairness and reciprocity and
showed whether the model based on the sense of reciprocity
and the self-concept explains the dynamic behaviors in an
iterated competitive game comparable to the models based on
the inequality averseness of material payoff. If one’s own kindness
affects one’s next behavior, the proposed model that focuses on
the self-concept will predict people’s behavior better than the
other models of fairness. In addition, we aimed to investigate the
process of rule establishment through changes in the parameters
of the model. If the players share a same structure of a utility
function, as various models suggested (e.g., Weitzman, 1965),
establishing a rule based on the shared utility function would be
beneficial to the players because strategies that maximize their
utility are similar among them. For example, if all players share
the utility function defined by inequality averseness, establishing
a rule that leads to an equal distribution of income maximizes
the utility of every player. A rule is reflected by the parameters
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of a model that adjusts behavior according to the parameter
values.
People often change their preferences after a social interaction
such as discussion or negotiation (Kaplan and Miller, 1987).
Changing a personal decision rule is often a result of consensus
between people. Once a consensus is achieved, they share a
common rule that governs the joint behavior (Penrod and
Hastie, 1980; Stasser and Davis, 1981; Hastie et al., 1983). It is
hypothesized that the players would show undefined behavioral
patterns at first, but players with a similar utility function
would gradually reach consensus and play based on the rules.
This hypothesis was tested by non-stationary parameter analysis
that calculates model parameters in continuous time windows,
instead of fitting the parameters once with the whole data in an
experiment. The changes of the parameters that lead to certain
behaviors are shown by this method. If the players gradually
establish a rule between them, the fitted parameters of each
player would reflect the rule as the game continues. For example,
the “initial benevolence” parameter in Cox et al.’s (2007) model
induces kind behavior when the parameter value is high. Thus,
the parameter values of the players who reach a consensus to
behave kindly to each other will increase during a game.
An iterated chicken game was used in the present study
to obtain behavioral data that reflect self-concept as well as
reciprocity (e.g., Jankowski, 1990). In a chicken game, each of the
two players controls a car that rushes toward each other. A player
who avoids becomes a “chicken” and loses certain amount of
reward to the opponent. If nobody avoids and the cars crash, they
both lose great amount of reward. Nobody loses or gains anything
when both of the players choose to avoid. The reward structure
of the game used in the present experiment is shown in Figure 1.
The chicken game is competitive in its nature and has no single
fairness equilibrium or Nash equilibrium. One needs to rush to
have a chance to gain more benefit than the opponent, but it has a
high risk of crash. When both players keep avoiding, they always
have an incentive to betray and rush to earn more. Therefore, this
game allows us to observe dynamic behavioral patterns that do
not easily allow consensus between players. Thus, it is appropriate
to see the gradual process of rule establishment between the
players, while varied patterns are expected through the process.
Furthermore, it is free from the beliefs about intentions because
the rush is always harmful to the other player and the avoidance
is always helpful; unintended harm, or kindness does not exist
in the game. It makes the application and comparison of various
models quite easy and simple.
Material and Methods
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Seventy two undergraduate students (mean age = 24.07, 29
females) at Korea University participated in the study for the
monetary reward of KRW 10,000 (about 9 US dollars). All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and
reported no neurological or psychiatric problems. The present
experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board at
FIGURE 1 | Reward structure of the chicken game in the present study
(in KRW).
Korea University (KU-IRB-13-66-A-1) and all participants gave
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Apparatus and Stimuli
A computer monitor and a keyboard were provided to both sides
of a partition and controlled by one main computer. Stimuli
and responses were controlled by MATLAB 7.12.0 software
(Mathworks, MA, U.S.A). Stimuli were presented on a 21.5-in.
LCD monitor (LG Flatron W2261VZ-PF, Korea) with a screen
resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels. Responses were made by
pressing the “a” key of a standard keyboard for the white colored
car on the left side and the “p” key of another keyboard for the
blue colored car on the right side. The cars presented on each
side were identical except for the color and direction and were
approximately 5 × 3.5 cm in size. A horizontal line with 1.3-cm
height was presented right below the cars to give an image of
road.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a pair of participants who
had not met each other before. Participants were not instructed
to pursue a certain goal in a game, but were informed that the
chicken game tests which person becomes a “chicken.” They were
told that they would be paid the summed rewards (costs) of two
randomly picked trials from the experimental session in addition
to 10,000 KRW. A trial in the game progressed as follows. At
the beginning of each trial, a white fixation cross (0.5 × 0.5 cm)
was presented for 1 s in the center of the screen with a black
background (see Figure 2). Then, two cars with different colors
popped up on each horizontal ends of the screen. The car on the
left side was assigned to the player seated on the left, and the
car on the right side was assigned to the player on the right. A
trial was composed of three 1-s intervals. After each interval, the
cars approached to each other by 8 cm and eventually crashed
after 3 s, unless one or two players avoided before. The color of
the horizontal line below the cars was initially green in the first
interval, changed to yellow in the second interval, and changed
again to red in the third interval, imitating the colors of road
signals. The players were to choose to avoid by pressing the key
assigned to them at any interval. If any participant chose to avoid
at any time during a trial, his/her car on the screen disappeared in
the next interval. At the end of every trial, the resulting reward of
the trial was shown for 1 s on the screen of each participant. The
resulting rewards followed the reward table shown in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 2 | Procedure of the chicken game experiment.
After the written and oral instructions about the reward
structure and the sequence of the game, 10 practice-trials were
conducted. Then, participants were instructed to put in the
earplugs so that they could not hear the key-pressing sound of
the partner in themain trials. They started themain experimental
session by pressing the response keys when they were ready to
play. A total of 100 trials of the game were played during the
experimental session, with a 1-min break after the first 50 trials.
Models
Several models of fairness in human behavior associated with
fairness were built and compared in the iterated chicken game
structure. Most of the previous models had been developed for
one-shot games so they were adjusted to iterated games used in
the present study. Differences between the models lied in the
computation of the utility function of an action. The players
shared the same means to calculate the probability of taking an
action given the utility functions of a model. As such, here we
mainly describe how to compute the utility function of each of
three models: Fehr and Schmidt model, Cox’s reciprocity model
and the proposed self-concept model.
Fehr and Schmidt Model
We modified the two-player case of the Fehr and Schmidt model
to be applicable to an iterated game. In the modified Fehr and
Schmidt model, the total reward is the sum of rewards a player
has received up to the current trial and the expected reward after
the current trial to calculate:
E(5i) =
n− 1∑
t= 1
πi (t)+ E(π
ai
i )
E(5j) =
n− 1∑
t= 1
πj (t)+ E(π
ai
j )
(1)
E (5i) is the expected total reward of player i after he/she
conducts a certain action ai, and E(5j) is the expected total
reward of player j after player i conducts the action ai. πi(t) is
the reward of player i at trial t and E(π
ai
i ) is the expected reward
of player i for the current nth trial when he/she executes an action
ai. As any belief about the other’s behavior is not accounted for in
this model, E(πAi ) and E(π
A
j ) are calculated as the average reward
following all possible actions A. The utility function of action A
of player i, ui (A) is then given by,
ui(A) =
{
E(5i)− α(E
(
5j
)
− E (5i)), if E (5i) < E(5j)
E(5i)− β(E (5i)− E
(
5j
)
), if E (5i) ≥ E(5j)
(2)
where β ≤ α and 0 ≤ β < 1. E
(
5j
)
−E (5i) and E (5i)−E
(
5j
)
represent a utility loss from an unequal distribution of income.
Note that the utility loss from the disparity when a player’s
own income is lower than that of the opponent, α(E
(
5j
)
−
E (5i)), is larger than or equal to the loss from an advantageous
distribution, β(E (5i) − E
(
5j
)
), because α is no less than β . α
and β are free parameters to be fitted to the data (see below for
the optimization procedure).
Cox et al.’s Model
Cox et al.’s (2007) model was modified to be fitted to the
present game structure. The emotional state in the original
model was simplified by excluding a relative status parameter,
and our assumption that the sense of reciprocity is volatile was
implemented by a new parameter as follows:
fi (ai) =
πhj (ai)− E(π
h
j )
E(πhj − π
l
j )
(normalized) (3)
fi (ai) represents player i’s kindness to player j at each trial. π
h
j (ai)
is the highest payoff possible for player jwhen player i chooses an
action ai, and E(π
h
j ) is the average of the highest payoff possible
for player j for every action available for player i. A positive
value of fi(ai) indicates that player i becomes more kind and a
negative value indicates that he/she becomes less kind. It is then
normalized by E(πhj − π
l
j ), the average of the range of player j’s
payoff given by a difference between the highest and the lowest
possible payoff, (πhj −π
l
j ) for player j. This normalization process
ensures fi(ai) to have comparable values when applied to the
games with different reward scales. In the chicken game, the value
of fi
(
ai,j
)
is always 1 if player i or j avoids and -1 if he/she rushes.
That is, one who avoids is always perceived as kind with positive
fi value, while rushing is unconditionally unkind, reflected by the
negative value.
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Once the kindness value of fi is calculated, the emotional state
of player i, θi, in the Cox model is computed as follows:
ri = fj
(
aj
)
θi = δri
(4)
It is assumed that there is no definable difference in the relative
status between the participants in the present experiment. So
only the reciprocity, not the relative status is considered for the
emotional state in Cox et al.’s model. The reciprocity of player i,
ri is equal to the player j’s kindness to player i given the action
of player j. δ is the sensitivity to the reciprocity of player i that
determines the degree to which the emotional state is influenced
by the reciprocity (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1). The emotional state of player i at
trial t+1 is then updated as,
θi (t + 1) = γ θi (t)+ β (5)
Based on the present assumption that the sense of reciprocity is
volatile, the reciprocity at trial t is maintained only to the degree
of a retention parameter (γ ) with the restriction, 0≤ γ ≤1.
The initial benevolence parameter (−1 ≤ β ≤ 1) is added to
the reciprocity updated every trial. An individual with positive
β is inclined to show positive reciprocity and help others while
a person with negative β tends to show negative reciprocity and
harm others.
The utility function of action a of player i, ui (ai), at trial t is
given by,
ui (ai) =
1
α
((
n∑
t= 1
πi (t)+ E(π
ai
i )
)α
+ θi
(
n∑
t= 1
πj (t)+ E(π
ai
j )
)α)
(6)
The modified constant elasticity of the substitution (CES) utility
function is used as player i’s utility function for his/her action.
The convexity parameter α is restricted to 0< α ≤1 because if α is
negative, the utility of an action becomes negative even when the
income is extremely high. The effect of α varies according to one’s
emotional state. With a positive emotional state (θ> 0), a player
prefers an equal distribution of payoffs between the players when
α is low, and becomes indifferent to the distribution when α is
high.With a negative emotional state (θ< 0), he/she prefers more
strongly to have all the payoffs as his/her own with a lower α.
Self-concept Model
In the self-concept model, players update the degree of
reciprocity of themselves as well as that of their opponent’s. The
basic structure of the model is identical to the modified Cox’s
model as follows:
F
self
i (t + 1) = γ F
self
i (t)+fi(ai(t))
Fotheri (t + 1) = γ F
other
i (t)+ fj
(
aj (t)
)
+ β (7)
ri = 2(δF
other
i − (1− δ) F
self
i ) (8)
Player i’s degree of kindness (F
self
i ) and player j’s degree of
kindness perceived by player i (Fotheri ) are updated every trial
t using the f value, where the initial value of F is set to 0. If a
player keeps executing an unfavorable action, he/she is perceived
as harmful with a negative F value, and a player with helpful
behavior is perceived as helpful with a positive F value. γ refers
to the rate of retention of reciprocity as above, reflecting the
assumption that reciprocity is volatile. The initial benevolence
parameter β is added only to the other player’s kindness so that an
individual with a positive β perceives the other to be more kind,
and one with a negative β perceives the other to be less kind. The
reciprocity (ri) in this model is defined by a difference between
the degree of one’s own kindness and that of the other. If a player
perceives the other player’s degree of kindness as higher than
his/her own, positive reciprocity emerges. On the other hand,
negative reciprocity happens if a player thinks that he/she was
more kind than the other player was. Instead of the sensitivity to
the reciprocity parameter in Cox et al.’s model, a relative weight
of the other’s kindness parameter (0≤ δ ≤1) is developed to
compute the emotion state of player i. If δ is higher than 0.5, a
person cares more about other people’s kindness toward him/her
than his/her kindness to others. In Equation (8), the resulting
difference between weighted F values is doubled such that ri when
the relative weight is equal between self and the other (i.e., when
δ is 0.5) to become the reference (Fotheri − F
self
i ) which maintains
initial F values from Equation (7). The utility function of an
action is identical to that of the modified Cox’s model:
ui (ai) =
1
α
((
n∑
t= 1
πi(t)+ E(π
ai
i )
)α
+ ri
(
n∑
t= 1
πj(t)+ E(π
ai
j )
)α)
(9)
Probability of an Action
For all the models introduced above, the utility of all possible
actions was compared and an action with the highest expected
utility was chosen. The probability of an action for the next trial
was then calculated as follows:
pi(avoidi (t + 1)) = sigmoid(ui
(
avoid
)
− ui
(
rush
)
) (10)
sigmoid (z) =
1
1+ e−z
pi(avoidi (t + 1)) is a probability that player i chooses avoidance
as his/her next action. It increases with a higher utility of
avoidance and decreases with a lower utility. The probability of
choosing an action is calculated by the logistic sigmoid function,
sigmoid(z).
Model Evaluation
Model Fitting
The probabilities of action predicted by the models were fitted
to the behavioral data to the way it maximizes the logistic log
likelihood (log L) of the prediction.
log L =
n(trial)∑
t= 1
n(player)∑
i= 1
log p
(
ai(t)
)
(11)
The fmincon function in the optimization toolbox of MATLAB
7.12.0 was used to define the parameters that maximize
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the logistic log likelihood. The models were then evaluated
by Bayesian Integration Criterion (BIC) score with fitted
parameters,
BIC = −2 log L+ k · log(n(trial)) (12)
where k indicates the number of parameters of a model. A
model with many parameters tends to show high likelihood, but
an increasing number of parameters may result in overfitting.
Because the BIC score penalizes free parameters, it is appropriate
to use this method for the comparison of the models that have
different numbers of parameters. A low BIC score refers to high
likelihood of a model. In the present analyses, the BIC scores of
the models were averaged over the pairs of participants.
Non-stationary Parameter Analysis
To observe parametric changes through the process of the games,
the optimal parameters that maximize the logistic log likelihood
in a smaller trial-window was calculated. The window size was
arbitrarily determined as 20 trials. The parameters were fitted to
the first to 20th trial, then to the second to 21st trial, and then to
n to n + 19 trial by the end of the trials. A specific method used
to extract the parameters of each model was same as before. With
the fitted parameters, the difference of the parameters between
the two players of each pair was calculated for every 20-trial
window along the game. Then, it was tested if the changes in
these parameter differences over time were correlated with the
BIC scores that were also calculated in each window with the
fitted parameters. Because the models showed lower BIC scores
and a better prediction when they predicted distinct behavioral
patterns, it was assumed that if the differences of parameters and
BIC scores were correlated, the changes in parameters reflected
the evolution of consensus that led to distinct behavioral patterns.
Results
Behavioral Data
In a two-trial window, there are four simple symmetric patterns
of behavior that can appear in the chicken game. One is a
“switching” pattern in which one player rushes and the other
player avoids in a trial and switches their role in the next trial. A
“mutual rush” pattern and a “mutual avoidance” pattern consist
of a pair of players who consistently rush or avoid. In an “unfair”
pattern, one player avoids and the other player rushes repeatedly.
These patterns are illustrated in Figure 3. The left half of each
picture shows player 1’s action and the other half shows that of
player 2. The light and dark colors indicate an avoidance and a
rush trial, respectively.
The numbers of these two-trial window patterns in the
behavioral data were counted to categorize the behaviors. The
behavioral data of a pair of participants was defined to have a
distinct pattern if the number of the trials showing a same specific
pattern exceeded a threshold. Thresholds were determined by the
simulation in the self-concept model with uniformly distributed
random parameters. The 50,000th largest number of each pattern
obtained from the 1,000,000 simulations was defined as a
threshold: as a result, it was 24 out of 100 trials for the “switching”
FIGURE 3 | Illustration of the four simple symmetric behavioral
patterns. Light colored block indicates an avoidance trial, and a dark colored
one indicates a rush trial. The left and the right columns represent the behavior
of Players 1 and 2, respectively.
pattern, 22 for the “mutual avoidance” pattern, 23 for the “mutual
rush” pattern, and 20 for the “unfair” pattern, respectively. The
number of the “unfair” pattern produced by extreme values of
parameters was relatively lower than that of the other patterns.
In the behavioral data, the most frequently observed pattern
was a “switching” pattern. A fairly clear and consistent switching
pattern was found for 12 out of 36 pairs of participants. In
most cases, the switching pattern sustained steadily once it was
generated. The “mutual rush” pattern was dominant for nine
pairs of participants who repeatedly crashed their cars. On the
contrary, two pairs of participants with the “mutual avoidance”
pattern consistently avoided each other. The “mutual rush”
pattern was likely to bemaintained through the whole gamewhile
the “mutual avoidance” pattern was hardly sustained for a long
period. The least frequent but still clear pattern was the “unfair”
pattern. In this pattern, one player kept rushing the car while
the other player continuously avoided. The pattern was found
for only one pair of players. The “unfair” pattern was dominant
through the whole game of that pair. The other 12 pairs did not
display any consistent pattern based on the thresholding scheme.
Players in those pairs showed seemingly random behaviors hardly
explained by a model.
Model Fitting and Simulations
The parameters in the models were fitted to the data in a
way that maximizes the likelihood (See Model Fitting). Because
the parameter values of a player imply a certain strategy in a
game that leads to different behavioral patterns with a different
opponent’s strategy, the parameters of Players 1 and 2 in the pairs
with the same behavioral pattern were averaged, respectively.
The fitted values of the models are shown in Table 1. In the
simulations using the parameters in Table 1, the self-concept
model successfully generated the patterns. The number of two-
trial windows with distinct patterns was counted for each pattern
over 100 trials of the simulation. On average from 10,000
simulations, there were 43.12 (standard deviation (SD = 7.13)
switching patterns, 66.11 (SD= 7.27) mutual avoidance patterns,
46.29 (SD = 10.85) mutual rush patterns, and 55.28 (SD =
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TABLE 1 | Average model parameters of the players with certain behavioral patterns.
(A) Fehr-Schmidt model.
Player 1 Player 2
alpha beta alpha beta
Switching 0.2301 0.3642 0.0863 0.1695
Rush 0.0538 0.5824 0.0013 0.2924
Avoid 0.0586 0.2500 0.0475 0.2500
Unfair 0.0187 0.0000 0.0187 0.0117
Undefined 0.0719 0.261 0.0483 0.1168
(B) Cox et al.’s model
Player 1 Player 2
alpha beta gamma delta alpha beta gamma delta
Switching 0.9904 −0.0653 0.0264 0.9872 0.9911 −0.0213 0.0357 0.9787
Rush 0.9031 −0.7186 0.5791 0.6693 0.7820 −0.5580 0.4555 0.7516
Avoid 0.9893 0.1341 0.3645 0.9945 0.9999 0.2317 0.3545 0.9996
Unfair 0.9435 0.9130 0.7067 0.0301 0.6106 −0.4942 0.932 0.1556
Undefined 0.9123 −0.1407 0.3300 0.8087 0.8635 −0.0684 0.4038 0.7397
(C) Self-concept model
Player 1 Player 2
alpha beta gamma delta alpha beta gamma delta
Switching 0.9764 −0.0689 0.1102 0.6099 0.9650 −0.0657 0.0638 0.6494
Rush 0.8632 −0.7388 0.6731 0.6965 0.7860 −0.4299 0.4423 0.7893
Avoid 0.8648 0.1266 0.3703 0.9786 0.9968 0.1704 0.2729 0.9171
Unfair 0.6443 0.9683 0.9303 0.9316 0.9112 −0.8921 0.1993 0.9905
Undefined 0.8256 −0.2006 0.5741 0.6464 0.7488 −0.0681 0.4533 0.7824
6.27) unfair patterns out of 99 two-trial windows in the 100 trial
simulations, respectively, when the parameter values for a certain
behavioral pattern were used. A sample of simulated behavioral
pattern is shown in Figure 4.
Model Evaluation
Figure 5 shows the BIC scores of the models for each group of
pairs with the distinct patterns averaged by the number of pairs.
Those averaged BIC scores were compared by the paired t-test.
The baseline was defined as the BIC score when the probabilities
of actions for every trial were predicted as 50% each, to test if
the models’ BIC scores are lower than the score at the chance
level prediction. The summary of comparison with the baseline
is shown in Table 2. The Fehr and Schmidt model showed a low
explanatory power for overall behavioral patterns from every pair
of participants. Overall BIC score of this model (M = 271.66,
SD = 32.17) was not significantly different from the baseline
prediction (M = 277.26, SD = 0), p = 0.6012. Cox et al.’s
model and the self-concept model both decently predicted all
the distinct patterns. They explained better than the Fehr and
Schmidt model and the baseline prediction for every distinct
pattern (ps < 0.01). The overall BIC score of the self-concept
model (M = 204.11, SD = 60.37) was significantly lower than
that of Cox et al.’s model (M = 222.42, SD = 55.68), p <
0.01. Specifically, the self-concept model explained the switching
FIGURE 4 | Simulated behavioral patterns using the self-concept
model with the average parameters of the players in each pattern.
pattern and undefined pattern significantly better than Cox et al.’s
model (ps < 0.01). The self-concept model also showed a lower
BIC score at the mutual rush and avoidance patterns than Cox
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1321
Lee et al. Self-concept in fairness
FIGURE 5 | BIC scores of the models for each behavioral pattern. Error
bars indicate standard errors. Asterisks refer to the significant difference from
the baseline at 5% level.
et al.’s model but the difference was not statistically significant
(ps = 0.1347 and 0.2275, respectively). Note, however, that the
t-test on the BIC scores of the avoidance pattern was not reliable
because there were only two samples. Similarly, the BIC scores
of the unfair pattern were inappropriate for the t-test as there
was only one pair with an unfair pattern. In addition, the self-
conceptmodel was the onlymodel with a BIC score for undefined
patterns significantly lower than that of the baseline prediction,
p = 0.0434. The Fehr and Schmidt model also showed significant
difference in undefined patterns, p = 0.0125, but the BIC score
was higher than the baseline, implying that the model predicts
worse than at chance level. No other significant difference was
found between the models.
Non-stationary Parameter Analysis
For Cox et al.’s model and the self-concept model, which
appeared to explain the behavior patterns better than the baseline,
the non-stationary parameter analysis was conducted. Among
the 81 sets of 20-trial time windows fitted with the models, t-test
analysis revealed significant changes in the model parameter
difference between the players from the first 40 to the second 40
of the time windows (ps < 0.01) in all the distinct patterns except
for the mutual rush pattern, as shown in Table 3. In particular,
the players’ difference of parameters significantly decreased for
every parameter in the switching and the avoidance patterns. The
temporal patterns of averaged parameter differences in the self-
concept model and its corresponding BIC scores are depicted
as a function of time progress in Figure 6. The difference of
the parameters between the players in the self-concept model
showed a strong correlation with BIC scores for most of the
parameters (see Table 4). Mostly, the BIC scores decreased with
decreasing difference in the parameters (positive correlation).
However, the initial benevolence parameter (β) in the mutual
rush and unfair patterns had no significant correlation with the
BIC scores. Although the results of the non-stationary parameter
analysis for Cox et al.’s model was similar to that of the self-
concept model, there were seven parameters with no significant
correlation with BIC score in Cox et al.’s model, while there were
five in the self-concept model. TA
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TABLE 3 | The results of the t-test between the players’ difference of parameters in the first half and the second half of the trial windows.
alpha beta gamma Delta
t p t p t p t p
(A) Cox et al.’s model.
Switching −12.52** 0.00 −3.78** 0.00 −13.38** 0.00 −12.78** 0.00
Rush 2.55* 0.02 0.72 0.47 0.81 0.42 −1.22 0.23
Avoid −7.90** 0.00 −14.26** 0.00 −9.91** 0.00 −11.38** 0.00
Unfair −1.95 0.06 3.91** 0.00 4.55** 0.00 −7.55** 0.00
(B) Self-concept model
Switching −6.09** 0.00 −7.22** 0.00 −7.75** 0.00 −4.31** 0.00
Rush 1.51 0.14 0.41 0.69 0.81 0.42 1.56 0.13
Avoid −4.62** 0.00 −15.15** 0.00 −14.14** 0.00 −9.19** 0.00
Unfair −7.89** 0.00 3.06** 0.00 7.12** 0.00 −1.01 0.32
**significant at 1% level.
*significant at 5% level.
FIGURE 6 | Differences of the parameters between two players in the self-concept model as a function of time progress. The dashed line represents the
additive inverse of the log likelihood value (-logL), which is proportional to the BIC score (see Equation 12).
Discussion
Extant models did not usually consider the role of one’s own
kindness when regarding reciprocity. Because many economic
games used in experiments have a bilateral structure, we
proposed a new model with a variable catching an emotion
aroused by the kindness of oneself to the other in addition
to the other’s kindness to oneself. In the chicken game used
in the present study with all the models modified to be
applicable to an iterated game, various behavioral patterns
were best explained by the newly proposed self-concept
model.
Behavioral Pattern Explanation
Four dominant patterns of behavior between two players were
found from the present behavioral data. It is notable that the
behavior in the most frequent “switching” pattern is unfair in
a one-shot game because only one player has a positive payoff
and the other player suffers from a negative payoff. However,
the resulting payoff of the iterated switching pattern reaches
to the equal distribution. This is a pattern that can be found
only in iterated games, and it reflects the reciprocal behavior
of the players. A player who avoided in a trial would be
predisposed to rush for the next trial as she/he had negative
reciprocity, whereas an individual who rushed in a trial would
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1321
Lee et al. Self-concept in fairness
be inclined to avoid in the next trial because she/he had positive
reciprocity.
The self-concept model showed an especially better prediction
for the switching pattern, compared to the other models. A
possible explanation is that a player’s negative reciprocity is
strengthened by positive self-concept if he/she avoids when
his/her counterpart rushes, and the positive reciprocity is also
strengthened by negative self-concept if he/she rushes when the
other player avoids. One of the main differences between Cox
et al.’s model and the self-concept model occurs at this point.
In Cox et al.’s model, the negative (positive) reciprocity from an
unfair trial that a player avoids (rushes) while the other player
rushes (avoids) is equal to the negative (positive) reciprocity
aroused by mutual rush (avoidance). However, it is natural to
have amore negative feeling when a player suffers from one-sided
unkindness than from mutual hostility, because of inequality in
outcome distribution (Tricomi et al., 2010).
Unlike the switching pattern, the mutual rush, and mutual
avoidance patterns are explained by one-shot fairness. Although
the mutual rush and the mutual avoidance patterns both have
the equal distribution of payoff, the mutual avoidance pattern
provides a higher payoff to the players than the mutual rush
pattern does. However, only two pairs showed the mutual
avoidance pattern while nine pairs revealed the mutual rush
pattern. It is worth noting that the resulting payoffs are the same
between the mutual avoidance pattern and the switching pattern.
People may just prefer the switching pattern to the avoidance
pattern if they are getting the same payoff. If it were not for the
switching pattern that occupied 12 pairs of participants out of
36 pairs, there might have been much more mutual avoidance
pattern, even more than the mutual rush pattern. It is reasonable
to choose the switching pattern instead of the mutual avoidance
pattern to guarantee a stable pattern. Betrayal is highly desirable
in the mutual avoidance pattern because a player who betrays
and rushes gets more reward. However, in the switching pattern,
a player who rushes when it is his/her turn to avoid also loses
his/her own payoff. Therefore, establishing the switching pattern
is advantageous to prevent betrayal. This is consistent with recent
studies suggesting that people are averse to betrayal besides
the monetary loss (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Aimone and
Houser, 2011, 2012).
The “unfair” pattern is incompatible with altruism because
it propagates the unequal distribution of payoff further and
further. The pattern is inconsistent with the prediction based
on reciprocity, too. The players in this pattern do not help the
other who is being kind to them nor punish the other with
selfish behavior. However, the pattern is explained by initial
benevolence in the present model. If a person with extremely
high initial benevolence meets the other with extremely low
initial benevolence, the unfair pattern could occur (see Table 1).
Because of extreme initial benevolence, they are strongly inclined
to do a specific pattern of behavior regardless of other people’s
interest or kindness (e.g., Rushton, 1984). The unfair pattern
refutes the assumption that people care about other people, but
only one pair showed this pattern in the present study.
In addition, the behaviors of 12 pairs of the participants
that did not show a repeating pattern were classified as the
“undefined” pattern. Only the self-concept model succeeded to
explain those patterns better than the baseline prediction. There
may still be logic inside the seemingly random patterns, and it
is likely that the unilateral reciprocity is not enough to explain
those patterns. The self-concept seems to play a certain role in an
undefined pattern.
Although all types of response patterns are explained by the
present model, the contribution of the self-concept in decision-
making is not always high. For example, Player 1’s average
delta (δ) value 0.6099 in the switching pattern shown in Table 1
indicates that the player relied on reciprocity by about 61%
and the self-concept influenced the rest of 39% in the decision
of the actions. In line with the other models of fairness (e.g.,
Rabin, 1993; Cox et al., 2007), the main determinant of action
was reciprocity, which is partially modulated by the self-concept.
Furthermore, the players in the mutual avoidance and unfair
patterns showed delta (δ) values higher than 0.9 on average,
indicating that some players were not sensitive to their self-
image and concentrated much more on the opponent’s behavior.
According to Mazar et al. (2008), who addressed that the self-
concept is not updated when people are inattentive to their own
moral standard of themselves, some players who are ignorant of
the fairness of their behavior would not adjust their self-concept
based on their action in a game. Especially, Player 2 in the unfair
pattern showed an extremely high delta (δ) value, implying that
he/she denied negative self-image from his/her unfair action of
continuously rushing against the opponent who avoided. The
characteristic that inclines the player to selfish behavior is also
reflected by a highly negative “initial benevolence” parameter (β)
value. Also, players in the mutual avoidance pattern maintained
mutual kindness by minimizing the effect of positive self-concept
that arouses moral-licensing that may result in betrayal. That
is, certain players continuously ignored their self-concept to
maintain their behavioral pattern, either it is kind, or unkind.
However, there were only three pairs of the players who were
insensitive to self-concept, resulting in the mutual avoidance or
unfair pattern. The result that the majority of the players in the
other patterns had a relatively low delta (δ) value implies that
people usually consider the self-concept when deciding their next
behavior. The players tended to become unkind after a kind
behavior, and vice versa. This finding supports the theory that
people adjust their behavior to maintain their self-concept within
an ideal level determined by personal moral standard (Sachdeva
et al., 2009). In the present model, the standard level of morality,
or fairness is the opponent’s kindness, because the players’ self-
concept is modulated when they feel that they are relatively
more kind or unkind than the opponent. This is consistent
with a widespread assertion that the self-concept and the moral
standard in social interaction is not completely internal (Shrauger
and Schoeneman, 1979). That is, one’s own self-concept reflects
the imagination about other people judge oneself (e.g., Schneider,
1970; Raven and Rubin, 1976).
Process of Non-stationary Parameter
Every player in a game has their own initial rule that decides
their behavior, but it is not always in accordance with the
other player’s rule (Stasser and Titus, 1985). There must be a
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process of negotiating between the players before they reach a
consensus to share a rule. Different initial rules of the players
converge to a common rule if they succeed to achieve consensus
after experiencing some trials (Stasser, 1988). The non-stationary
parameter analyses were conducted to see a process of rule
convergence as the game continues. The parameters in the self-
concept model reflect a specific rule of a player. For example, a
low convexity reflects a rule to bemore concerned about the equal
distribution of payoff, high initial benevolence implies a rule to be
kind regardless of reciprocity, and a low retention rate leads to a
rule to forget the past quickly and focus on the emotion from the
most recent behaviors. If the players in a game gradually reach a
consensus to share a rule, the parameters also change gradually
according to a forming rule.
The result of the non-stationary parameter analysis was
consistent with the assumption that the shared rules are formed
as time goes on. For many patterns, the parameters of the players
became similar to each other as the game proceeded so that the
difference of parameters gradually converged to zero as shown
in Table 3 and Figure 6. In addition, the explanatory power of
the model showed a significant correlation with the difference of
the parameters (see Table 4). As the parameters of the players
became similar, distinct patterns occurred more often and the
BIC scores decreased. That is, the model predicted the behavior
better when the players’ parameters were shared between them.
One exception is the unfair pattern, where the parameter values
of “beta” are extremely different among two players. This is
because the pattern arises mostly from oppositely extreme initial
benevolence parameter (β) that leads the players to the contrary
behaviors. Also, large difference of retention parameter (γ ) in
“unfair” pattern in Tables 1B,C indicates that one player with
low β deviates from previous behaviors to pursue selfish interest.
These differences are also reflected in non-stationary analysis
where the differences of β and γ ) among two players are enlarged
as time goes on (see Table 3).
As shown in Table 4, all the parameters in the switching
pattern and the mutual avoidance pattern showed a strong
correlation with the explanatory power. The difference between
the parameters showed a linear trend of decreasing as the game
proceeded and so did the BIC score. It is well fitted to the present
assumption that the two players share a rule gradually as the
game continues. The switching pattern and the mutual avoidance
pattern reflect the process of the rule establishment resulting
from a consensus between the players. The parameters of the
players of those patterns converged to a certain point as the game
proceeded, implying that they reached a consensus to have the
same rule. In addition, consistent with the previous suggestion
that betrayal is highly desirable in the mutual avoidance pattern,
the BIC score of the mutual avoidance pattern started to increase
from the last 20 trials of the game. This result indicates a broken
consensus when the players try to betray the others to get more
reward of their own, as usually seen in Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g.,
Komorita and Mechling, 1967; Kershenbaum and Komorita,
1970).
The patterns of parameters and the explanatory power were
not stable in the mutual rush pattern and the unfair pattern.
The differences between the players in the retention parameter
(γ ) and the sensitivity to the other (δ) parameter showed no
significant correlation with the BIC score in those patterns.
Further, the changes of the explanatory power were not linear
as those of the switching pattern were. Overall, the process of
the mutual rush pattern and the unfair pattern was unstable
compared to that of the switching pattern and the mutual
avoidance pattern.
A shared rule that generates the switching and mutual
avoidance patterns is regarded as a good consensus because it
maximizes the joint income of the players and the distribution
is equal. It is a desirable state for the people who act based on the
utility function provided by the self-concept model. On the other
hand, the mutual rush, and unfair patterns are disadvantageous
TABLE 4 | Correlation between the difference of parameters and the log likelihood of each behavioral pattern.
(A) Cox et al.’s model
alpha Beta Gamma delta
r p r p r p r p
Switching 0.7956** 0.0000 0.8704** 0.0000 0.4423** 0.0000 0.8394** 0.0000
Rush 0.1629 0.1489 0.3095** 0.0052 0.2525 0.0238 −0.0308 0.7867
Avoid 0.5670** 0.0000 0.7478** 0.0000 0.7961** 0.0000 0.5600** 0.0000
Unfair 0.0466 0.6817 −0.3325** 0.0026 −0.3466** 0.0016 0.6591** 0.0000
Undefined −0.1037 0.3611 −0.0171 0.8799 −0.4869** 0.0000 −0.2060 0.0668
(B) Self-concept model
Switching 0.4767** 0.0000 0.7156** 0.0000 0.8056** 0.0000 0.4209** 0.0001
Rush 0.2608* 0.0195 0.3806** 0.0005 0.1721 0.1270 −0.0286 0.8014
Avoid 0.4012** 0.0002 0.7498** 0.0000 0.7704** 0.0000 0.6410** 0.0000
Unfair 0.7963** 0.0000 −0.6972** 0.0000 −0.0227 0.8420 −0.0993 0.3810
Undefined 0.3541* 0.0013 −0.4797** 0.0000 0.3886** 0.0004 0.1302 0.2500
**significant at 1% level.
*significant at 5% level.
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because the payoff is very low in the mutual rush pattern and
the distribution is extremely unequal in the unfair pattern. It
is likely that people continuously try to go against the rule
that makes the mutual rush pattern and the unfair pattern,
even after a shared rule is formed (e.g., Harrison and McCabe,
1996). This is a possible reason why the rules were not stably
established and maintained in the mutual rush and the unfair
patterns.
At first, it was assumed that the players who failed to share a
rule generate undefined patterns. Thus, it is surprising that the
parameters in the undefined patterns also showed a significant
correlation with the BIC score (see Table 4). Further, the BIC
score of the undefined patterns tended to decrease slightly as the
game proceeded. It implies that a seemingly undefined pattern
also has some process of negotiation between the players that
slowly leads to a stable pattern. If they havemore time to establish
a common rule, they might have reached a consensus that makes
a distinct pattern.
It has been suggested that non-verbal signals express the
intention of the signaler, and the behaviors are determined in
interactions with the recipient (Dawkins and Krebs, 1978; Caryl,
1979). That is, the behaviors are modulated by the expectation
about the other people’s behavior according to the interpretation
of non-verbal signal (Hinde, 1985). In the present study, the
players often tried to influence each other by expressing their
internal state through their behavior. For example, in the mutual
rush pattern some players started to avoid at some trials,
presumably asking for reconciliation. The motivational states
conveyed by a signal are then assessed by the behaviors that
follow (e.g., Tinbergen, 1959; Baerends, 1976). The receiver of the
signal may respond by avoiding, or ignoring it by keeping rushing
after the interpretation. The players continuously send, receive,
and respond to the signal from the behavior and decide their
next action. The non-stationary parameter analyses demonstrate
the process of negotiation through the signal. The finding that
the behaviors gradually became more predictable suggests that
people usually establish a common rule to understand each other
through the interactions (e.g., Penrod and Hastie, 1980; Stasser
and Davis, 1981).
Conclusions
The results showed that the phenomena in the chicken game
are well explained by the model in which one’s own kindness
is considered. The concept of one’s own kindness is applicable
to other types of games. For example, in Harbaugh and
Krause (2000) study, the result of an iterated public good
game experiment revealed a general pattern that the players’
contribution to public good increased at first, but started to
decrease at a certain point. Furthermore, participants who made
a large contribution in the last iteration of the public good
experiment did not share their reward much in a dictator game
that was conducted right after the last trial of the public good
game. The authors attributed the result to a confusion of the
participants who did not clearly understand the reward structure
of the games. However, it is possible that the results reflect the
concept of one’s own kindness (Bodner and Prelec, 2002). If the
players made a large enough contribution in the previous game,
they would feel morally licensed to make a lower contribution
afterwards.
The self-concept determined by one’s own kindness is
especially important for a game such as the dictator game in
which reciprocity plays a small role because the receiver does not
have any chance to help or punish the dictator (Cason and Mui,
1998). Theremust be a fluctuating pattern in the players’ behavior
in an iterated dictator game if the balancing of self-concept
indeed influences decision-making. For example, a player who
took most of the payoff in a trial may provide a generous offer
next time to offset the negative self-concept from the previous
behavior. It would be meaningful to find an implication in the
variations of the offer in the game that may have not been
interpreted.
The comparison of the models showed that a simple
inequality averseness of payoff was not enough to explain the
dynamic patterns observed in the chicken game. The model
that incorporates the reciprocity and the self-concept provided
a much better prediction of the behaviors. The result indicates
that people care about their own kindness to others in addition
to other people’s kindness toward them (e.g., Benabou and Tirole,
2003). However, the main determinant of the behavior was
reciprocity in the present model, although it was modulated
by the self-concept to some degree. Therefore, the self-concept
model complements various models of fairness that include
the concept of reciprocity, rather than contradicting them. The
findings in the non-stationary parameter analyses were consistent
with the assumption that the players in a game gradually establish
a common rule that determines the way they act. It implies that
people influence each other with non-verbal communication that
signals their internal state during the game and reach a consensus
at some point. The pattern was more stable when the rule was
mutually beneficial than when it was unfair or mutually harmful,
suggesting that people always have a motivation to change a rule
when the current one is not satisfactory. The present model has
the potential to be applied to other games that are seemingly
affected by the self-concept, but have not been interpreted in that
way. It would be especially effective in games where the effect of
reciprocity is minimized and the players mostly concentrate on
their own behavior.
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